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THE SKY IS STILL NOT FALLING 
Richard D. Friedman 
Crawford v. Washington1 dramatically transformed the law 
governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to 
the Constitution, and much for the better. Under the old regime 
associated with Ohio v. Roberts,2 the Clause was little more than 
a constitutionalization of the modern law of hearsay, 
incorporating its multiple particular oddities and also a general 
principle that the law poses no obstacle to admission of an out-
of-court statement that is deemed by the courts to be reliable. 
This doctrine bore no relation to the text or history of the 
Confrontation Clause. It reflected no principle worthy of 
respect—and in part as a result, it was highly manipulable. 
Crawford, by contrast, articulated a simple and robust principle 
that is apparent on the face of the Clause and in its history, and 
is a central element of our system of criminal adjudication: A 
witness against an accused must (unless the accused waives or 
forfeits the right) give her testimony in the presence of the 
accused, subject to cross-examination. Ordinarily, she must do 
so at trial. If she is unavailable to testify then, however, the 
accused’s confrontation right will be satisfied if she gave her 
testimony on some prior occasion at which he had the 
opportunity to be confronted by her and cross-examine her. 
Crawford, by razing the old structure of Confrontation 
Clause doctrine, left many open questions. Chief among these 
was the standard for determining whether an out-of-court 
statement that is later offered against an accused should be 
deemed to be testimonial—that is, whether the person who made 
                                                          
 Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 
School. 
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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the statement should be deemed to have been acting as a witness 
and so within the scope of the Confrontation Clause. I had no 
doubt that there would be decades of litigation, including 
numerous Supreme Court cases, before the new framework was 
completely filled in. But it appeared to me that the basic principle 
of Crawford was so obviously correct, so fundamental to our 
system, so easy to state and to understand, and so far superior to 
what had prevailed before, that prosecutors and judges as well as 
those on the defense side would quickly come to accept it. 
Silly me. In the eight years since Crawford, many 
prosecutors have attempted at every turn to limit its holding. 
Lower courts have often used strained reasoning to reach results 
that undercut Crawford’s holding. And before the Supreme 
Court, most of the states, and sometimes the United States as 
well, have joined in, trying to scare the justices into believing 
that they will create enormous practical problems if they do not 
cut back on Crawford. 
Cases since Crawford have mainly fallen into two categories. 
One involves accusations of crime, made by the apparent victim 
shortly after the incident. In Michigan v. Bryant,3 a majority of 
the Court adopted an unfortunately constricted view of the word 
“testimonial” in this context. That decision was a consequence of 
the Court having failed to adopt a robust view of when an 
accused forfeits the confrontation right.4 How the Court will deal 
                                                          
3 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
4 In Bryant, Anthony Covington, suffering from severe gunshot wounds, 
told the police that Bryant had shot him half an hour before and several 
blocks away. Id. at 1150. There was no indication that Covington realized 
death was close, but he died several hours later. Id. In my view, the 
statement should clearly have been deemed testimonial. Covington did not 
make the statement in order to get medical help or stop a crime spree, but to 
finger the man who he claimed had shot him. But a holding that Covington’s 
statement could not be admitted at a trial of Bryant seems singularly 
unappealing. Id. at 1167. Before Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), a 
court might have held that Bryant forfeited the confrontation right by 
engaging in serious, intentional misconduct that foreseeably rendered 
Covington unavailable to appear as a witness at trial. But Giles foreclosed a 
decision along those lines. In that case, the Court held that an accused does 
not forfeit the confrontation right unless he engaged in the misconduct for the 
purpose of rendering the witness unavailable. Giles, 554 U.S. at 368. As a 
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with this situation—one mistake made in an attempt to compensate 
for another—is a perplexing and important question. This Essay, 
though, concentrates on the other principal category of post-
Crawford cases, involving forensic laboratory reports. In this 
context, the Supreme Court has, thus far at least, come to what I 
believe is the proper result, recognizing that such reports, 
prepared for use in investigation and prosecution of crime, are 
testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. But in the 
most significant cases, the Court has reached this result over the 
strenuous dissent of four justices, and over the objections of most 
of the states. 
MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS 
The key case was Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,5 which 
held that, at least as a general matter, forensic laboratory reports 
are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. I 
regarded that basic holding as quite obvious—it was, as Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the majority said, a “rather straightforward 
application” of Crawford. But four justices, led by Justice 
Kennedy, dissented, and they, together with Massachusetts and 
its supporting amici (including the United States, thirty-five 
states, the District of Columbia, the National District Attorneys 
Association, and numerous local prosecutors), raised a flurry of 
arguments in opposition. This gave Justice Scalia a chance to 
clear away a good deal of underbrush, as one by one—quite 
correctly—he set these arguments aside. 
x A lab report is ordinarily not accusatory. That does not 
matter—the Confrontation Clause is not limited to accusatory 
statements. Such a limitation would eviscerate the right, 
because in many cases there is no witness who can testify 
that she observed the accused committing a crime. 
                                                          
result, the only way the Court could accommodate the powerful, and 
understandable, impulse to admit Covington’s statement was to hold that the 
statement was non-testimonial. This means that the Confrontation Clause 
would pose no obstacle to admission of the statement, even if Covington had 
survived and was living around the corner from the courthouse at the time of 
trial. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167–68. 
5 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). 
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x An analyst who prepares a lab report is not an “ordinary” or 
“conventional” witness. The dissent raised several points in 
support of this rather odd assertion. The analyst writing the 
report was reporting near-contemporaneous observations. 
Not really true, responded Justice Scalia—the report was 
completed almost a week after performance of the tests—and 
immaterial in any event: A witness can testify about 
contemporaneous observances. The analyst who completed 
the report did not observe the crime itself or “any human 
action related to it.” But again, so what? No one would 
deny, I suppose, that an observer who testifies to the state of 
the crime scene after the fact is a witness for Confrontation 
Clause purposes. She is reporting on information that may 
help the trier of fact determine whether a crime was 
committed and, if so, how. But the same is true of the lab 
analyst who testifies that a given substance contains cocaine. 
Finally, according to the dissent, the lab analyst is not 
testifying in response to police interrogation. That assertion 
is dubious at best: The lab analyst was responding to a police 
request. But the broader response is yet again, so what? The 
confrontation right is independent of, and much older than, 
the institutions of a police force or a public prosecutor. It is 
a right that the accused has with respect to the witness, and 
if the witness makes her statement on her own initiative that 
does not nullify the right. 
x The lab report was, Massachusetts contended, a product of 
neutral, scientific testing, rather than an historical account 
subject to distortion. Once more, Justice Scalia challenged 
both the truth and the materiality of the premise. Lab testing, 
while usually accurate, is far from foolproof. Nor can agents 
of the government properly be called neutral in a criminal 
prosecution. But beyond that, Crawford forbids a court from 
trying to exempt species of evidence from the confrontation 
right on the ground that they are reliable and so cross-
examination is unlikely to be productive. 
x Massachusetts contended that the lab reports were akin to 
business records and so exempt from the Confrontation 
Clause. True, forensic lab reports are produced routinely—
but to say that this is sufficient to guarantee admissibility 
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would only mean that the confrontation rights of the accused 
are routinely violated. Forensic laboratory reports are 
routinely produced for use in prosecution, and that is what 
makes them testimonial. Statements genuinely falling within 
the hearsay exception for business records are not prepared 
for litigation purposes.6 But beyond that, a statement cannot 
be exempted from the Confrontation Clause on the ground—
part of the rejected Roberts doctrine—that it fits within a 
well-recognized hearsay exception. True, Crawford 
suggested that business records are typically not testimonial 
statements. But that was merely an empirical observation: If 
a statement satisfies the requirements for the hearsay 
exception, it will probably also be properly characterized as 
non-testimonial. That is not at all the same thing as saying 
that qualification as a business record means that the 
statement is not testimonial. 
x Melendez-Diaz could have subpoenaed the lab analysts and 
made them his own witnesses. But, as the Court emphasized, 
that turns criminal procedure on its head. It is the 
prosecution’s job, not the defense’s, to produce the witnesses 
against the accused. The difference is not merely one of 
formality; it is far better for the defense if the prosecution 
produces its witness live and then the defense decides 
whether and how to cross-examine, than if the prosecution 
presents the testimony in written form and the defense can 
examine the witness only by calling her to the stand as part 
of his case. 
x The practical burden on the courts of requiring lab analysts 
to testify, asserted those on the state side, would be 
intolerable. Once again, Justice Scalia challenged both the 
accuracy and the materiality of the premise. “[W]e may not 
disregard [the Confrontation Clause] at our convenience,” he 
wrote. Besides, he doubted the “dire predictions” of disaster: 
“Perhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall [as a 
result of the decision] is that it has not done so already.” 
That is, Melendez-Diaz had no impact on those states that 
                                                          
6 E.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943), cited with 
approval by Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538. 
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already complied with the constitutional rule it required, and 
those states had not been led to ruin. 
The majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz was quite wonderful. 
Point by point, it swept aside potential obstructions to the 
confrontation right that should never have been erected. But I 
confess that I found it disappointing in two respects. One was 
that the opinion secured only five votes—and the four dissenters 
seemed so ready to undercut Crawford severely, largely because 
of misguided concern that the practical consequences of the 
decision would be intolerable.  
The other respect was perhaps less to my credit. At the time, 
I had a petition for certiorari pending in Briscoe v. Virginia. 
The petition contended that Virginia did not satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause in providing that a lab certificate could be 
admissible but the accused could present the analyst as his own 
witness. The Melendez-Diaz decision, it appeared clear, had just 
resolved this issue in our favor—great news for my clients, but 
apparently precluding my hopes of arguing the issue in the 
Supreme Court. I, like most observers, expected that the Court 
would, as a matter of course, remand Briscoe to the Virginia 
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz. It 
was startling, therefore, when four days later the Court instead 
simply granted certiorari. There was widespread speculation that 
the four dissenters had decided to take Briscoe in hopes of 
undercutting Melendez-Diaz. The speculation gained credence 
from the fact that Justice David Souter, a member of the 
majority, had announced his retirement and his prospective 
successor, Sonia Sotomayor, was a former prosecutor.7 Once 
again, state-side amici—including the United States, a majority 
of the states, and the District of Columbia—raised the 
catastrophic consequences that would occur if the defendant’s 
position prevailed. But at the argument, it became quite clear 
that Justice Sotomayor was not about to undermine a seven-
month-old precedent. Two weeks later, the Court did what 
                                                          
7 During oral argument in Briscoe, Justice Scalia lent additional force to 
the speculation, suggesting that the Court had taken the case for no reason 
other than to consider overruling Melendez-Diaz. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 58, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-
11191).  
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observers had expected it to do in the first place, remanding the 
case for proceedings consistent with Melendez-Diaz.8 
But, of course, the matter did not rest there. Nine months 
later, the Court granted certiorari in Bullcoming v. New Mexico. 
The Court’s makeup had shifted again—Justice Kagan had 
replaced Justice Stevens, a member of the Melendez-Diaz 
majority. In Bullcoming, unlike Melendez-Diaz and Briscoe, the 
prosecution had presented a live witness from the laboratory, 
rather than simply the report. But the witness was not the 
analyst who had performed the test and prepared the report, for 
he had been placed on unpaid administrative leave. I thought this 
case was extremely easy—after all, in his Melendez-Diaz dissent, 
Justice Kennedy noted that the Court had made clear that it “will 
not permit the testimonial statement of one witness to enter into 
evidence through the in-court testimony of a second . . . .”9 
Perhaps for that reason, the United States did not appear as 
amicus in support of the state. But thirty-three states did, as well 
as organizations of prosecutors and medical examiners, and once 
again they focused on the practical consequences that would 
follow if the author of the report had to testify live. 
Nevertheless, I hoped that some or all of the Melendez-Diaz 
dissenters would acknowledge that the Court had decided that 
forensic lab reports are testimonial statements, and that it 
obviously followed that a surrogate witness could not testify as 
to the contents of a lab report stating events and results that the 
surrogates had not observed. In the end, Justice Kagan stayed 
with the majority, which once again—this time in an opinion by 
Justice Ginsburg—treated the case as virtually a foregone 
conclusion. But the bloc of four dissenters remained intact. Once 
again, Justice Kennedy took the lead, and this time some of his 
language seemed to indicate that he was ready to throw out the 
entire Crawford framework and return to something like that of 
Roberts. 
                                                          
8 Briscoe, 130 S. Ct. at 1316. 
9 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS 
Five days after the Bullcoming decision, the Court took one 
more case involving forensic lab reports. Williams v. Illinois is 
the first in the line that involves DNA testing, one of the most 
complex types of forensic testing. It is also different from the 
prior cases in two respects. First, an in-court witness used the 
report in question, by a Cellmark lab, in part to formulate her 
opinion that the DNA profile indicated on that report—taken 
from a vaginal swab of the victim of a sexual assault—matched 
that of the accused. Second, the Cellmark report was never 
formally introduced into evidence. I do not believe that either of 
these facts should make a difference. The Cellmark report 
transmitted information that was important to link the accused to 
the crime; the in-court expert’s opinion that the two profiles 
matched would be worthless for the case if the Cellmark report 
were inaccurate. And the essential substance of the Cellmark 
report was conveyed to the trier of fact. Williams is pending as I 
write this. I worry that if the state prevails, the Court will have 
opened a broad path for manipulation around the Confrontation 
Clause—not only in the context of forensic lab reports, but 
generally. Any person whom a state is willing to designate as an 
expert may be allowed to testify to her conclusions, and in doing 
so she may convey to the trier of fact the substance of 
testimonial statements on which she relied. 
In Williams, the United States has returned as an amicus 
favoring the state—as have forty-two other states, the District of 
Columbia, Guam, and various prosecution-related agencies and 
associations. This Essay focuses on the brief submitted by the 
New York County District Attorney’s Office and the New York 
City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner10—what I will call 
the New York brief—because it makes the most detailed and 
aggressive assertions of impractical consequences that would 
follow from a holding for Williams. Indeed, it appears to me 
                                                          
10 Brief for New York County District Attorney’s Office and New York 
City Office of Chief Medical Examiner as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505), 
2011 WL 5125054 [hereinafter New York Brief]. 
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that the brief is in large part an attempt to scare the Supreme 
Court into thinking that if Williams wins this case, prosecution 
use of DNA and some other types of forensic evidence will 
become unfeasible. That is simply not true.11 
The New York brief builds on the fact that DNA testing 
involves several different stages. It suggests that if Williams 
prevails, a prosecutor wishing to present DNA evidence would 
have to bring to court one witness for each stage. But that is not 
so. At the outset, bear in mind that the Confrontation Clause 
requires the presence at trial only of those persons who make 
testimonial statements that are in some way conveyed to the trier 
of fact. I use this phrasing because the Clause may be invoked 
even if the prosecutor does not formally introduce the statement. 
Consider the stages of DNA testing as described in the New 
York brief: 
(a) Examination: A technician “examines the sample and 
takes cuttings for DNA extraction.”12 There is no 
testimonial statement—or any statement at all—in this 
process; examining and cutting do not constitute a 
statement. 
(b) Extraction: A technician adds reagents to the sample. 
Again, the process does not involve a statement. 
(c) Quantitation: A technician measures the amount of 
DNA. Presumably this technician reports that amount. 
But even assuming for purposes of argument that this 
report is a testimonial statement, there is no need for it to 
be presented to the trier of fact. The witness who reports 
on the profile found in the later part of the process does 
not have to convey it to the trier of fact, or even rely in 
her own testimony on the results of this stage. We know 
from the fact that, by hypothesis, a DNA profile was 
ultimately found that there was enough DNA to perform 
                                                          
11 The discussion here is drawn in large part from an entry I posted on 
the Confrontation Blog. Richard D. Friedman, Thoughts on the Brief of the 
New York DA and OCME in Williams, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Dec. 5, 
2011, 3:27 PM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/12/thoughts-on-
brief-of-new-york-da-and.html. 
12 New York Brief, supra note 10, at 7.  
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the analysis. Put another way: The quantitation stage is a 
screen, used to determine whether the process should 
continue; once the process does continue, neither 
subsequent analysts nor the trier of fact need rely on the 
results of this stage. 
(d) Amplification: A technician copies specific portions of 
the DNA to raise them to sufficient levels for testing. 
Once more, performance of this test is not a statement, 
let alone a testimonial statement. 
(e) Electrophoresis: Here, at last, we have the 
performance of the test that yields the numbers and graph 
from which a DNA profile may be deduced. The printout 
of the machinery used to perform the test is not in itself a 
testimonial statement. But presumably the printout bears 
identifying information that was entered by a human, and 
(assuming the test was clearly performed for forensic 
purposes) that should be a testimonial statement. If, as in 
Williams, an analyst at the lab deduces the profile of 
interest and prepares a report presenting that profile, that 
report is a testimonial statement, and thus provides the 
essential information that the prosecution needs.13 
Even assuming Williams wins and some labs continue to 
adhere to the procedure described by the New York brief, the 
Confrontation Clause would, at least presumptively, say nothing 
about most of the technicians involved in that procedure. As a 
check on this, try this thought experiment: Assume for the 
moment that Williams wins his case. Would the signatories to 
the New York brief contend in subsequent cases that all the 
technicians in the procedure they have described have to testify 
for DNA test results to be admissible? Not very likely. 
Now, I have included the “at least presumptively” 
qualification in the last paragraph because I have not yet said 
anything about chain of custody. So long as a witness speaks 
only about what she knows from personal knowledge, chain of 
custody is not a confrontation problem per se. Melendez-Diaz 
makes clear that, as an initial matter, it is up to the prosecution 
to decide what witness’s statements it wishes to present to 
                                                          
13 Friedman, supra note 11. 
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establish the chain of custody.14 If the gaps in the chain are too 
great, there may be insufficient proof, and at some point that 
could be a due process violation. It may be, depending on what 
procedures the laboratory used to tag the sample and maintain 
identification throughout the procedure, that to prevent such a 
violation, the prosecution would have to present one or more 
additional witnesses. But reasonable inferences can bridge even 
some substantial gaps. I do not believe the sample needs to have 
been sitting still during those gaps; technicians may have 
performed procedures on it other than letting it change naturally 
over time. 
Consider also that, given the sensitivity of modern methods 
of DNA testing, in most cases if the prosecution would have 
difficulty bringing to court the lab witnesses necessary to prove 
the results of a given test, it can simply ask for the sample to be 
retested. This could be done perhaps by a single witness who 
can easily come to court. Note, for example, that only one 
technician from the Illinois State Police lab did the test on the 
blood sample taken from Williams. Retesting would not be 
necessary in the vast majority of cases, because so few cases go 
to trial, but the availability of this option reduces the overall 
burden on the state enormously. 
The Illinois test in Williams serves as a reminder that the 
Sixth Amendment does not incorporate the Cellmark protocol. 
Much of the New York brief seems to suggest that 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence must take as given 
procedures such as those used by Cellmark in Williams and 
described by the brief. But other labs, like the one in Illinois, 
use different procedures. For example, the Michigan State 
Police lab rarely involves more than three people in a given 
DNA test.15 Is such vertical integration less efficient than an 
assembly-line procedure? Perhaps. But the standard for 
constitutionality cannot be the procedure that would be optimal 
when the constitutional rights of the accused are disregarded. 
 
                                                          
14 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1. 
15 Interview with John Collins, Director, Mich. State Police Lab. (Jan. 
2011). 
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THE PRACTICAL CONCERNS OF LIVE TESTIMONY 
 
I do not mean to suggest—and I do not believe—that it is 
inappropriate for the Supreme Court, in considering the bounds of 
the Confrontation Clause, to pay some attention to the practical 
consequences of its decision. Crawford has compelled the Court 
to build a new structure, and I think it is fitting for the Court to 
subject its tentative conclusions to a reality check. If the result of 
its doctrines were to be a practical disaster, the Court should 
think again; “the Constitution . . . is not a suicide pact.”16 But 
disaster avoidance does not require optimal efficiency. And the 
fact is that states that—like my own state of Michigan—use more 
integrated procedures do not suffer unduly on that account.17 
Indeed, in conjunction with Bullcoming, I supervised a study 
of Michigan cases to determine how many lab witnesses actually 
testify at trials. In rape cases in which DNA evidence was 
presented, we found that an average of 1.24 lab witnesses 
testified per trial.18 This strikes me as a very tolerable number, 
given that DNA is a particularly complex form of laboratory 
evidence. In drug cases, we found an average of .46 live lab 
witnesses per trial, and about .55 live lab witnesses per test 
presented. No more than one witness testified live with respect 
to a given test.19 In driving-under-the-influence cases, an average 
of about .55 lab witnesses per trial, and about .67 per test 
presented, testified live.20 
                                                          
16 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
17 I made this point in a related context in an exchange with Justice 
Scalia in the Briscoe argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–22, 
Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191).  
18 Richard D. Friedman, Is There a Multi-Witness Problem with Respect 
to Forensic Lab Tests?, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Dec. 7, 2010, 10:11 AM), 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-there- 
multi-witness-problem-with.html. 
19 There were 71 live lab witnesses in 154 trials. Id. In 116 of the cases 
lab results were presented, accounting for at least 128 tests—meaning that an 
average of .55 lab witnesses per test testified at trial. Id.  
20 There were 55 trials, in 41 of which lab results were presented, and a 
total of 30 lab witnesses testified live. Id. There was a total of at least 45 lab 
tests, meaning an average of .67 lab witnesses per test testified live at trial. 
Id. 
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This means that—despite the fears expressed by the Melendez-
Diaz dissenters—many Michigan defendants stipulate to the 
admissibility of forensic lab evidence without the need for the 
prosecution to bring in live testimony. Why is that so?21 The plus 
side of demanding confrontation may appear minimal. Experience 
may compel counsel to recognize that the lab reports will not be 
excluded; the prosecution will ensure that any necessary lab 
witnesses appear.22 Also, in some cases, the defense does not see 
much likelihood of any worthwhile gains from cross-examination. 
The negative side of demanding confrontation may appear 
substantial. For example, the defense’s chance of reaching an 
acceptable plea bargain may be substantially impaired if counsel 
is perceived as game-playing in hopes of imposing costs on the 
prosecution.23 The defense may regard a live, perhaps very 
credible, prosecution witness as far worse than introduction of a 
piece of paper or reading of a stipulation. 
States that are concerned about cost can use other mechanisms 
as well. Melendez-Diaz expressly approved simple notice-and-
demand statutes, under which a prosecutor may give advance 
notice of intent to introduce lab evidence, and the accused then 
                                                          
21 Some of the following discussion is drawn from my article, Richard 
D. Friedman, Potential Responses to the Melendez-Diaz Line of Cases, 90 
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 396 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
22 It sometimes happens that defense counsel will demand that the lab 
witness appear, believing that doing so is cost-free, and then stipulate to 
admissibility of the report when the witness does appear. But this type of 
game playing does not appear to be an insuperable problem, in part for the 
reason stated in the text. A prosecutor concerned about it can further limit its 
effect by announcing a policy—or simply informing counsel in the given 
case—that if the accused demands that the witness appear live, and the 
witness does in fact appear at trial prepared to testify, the prosecution will 
then not stipulate to admissibility of a lab report but instead will insist that 
the witness testify live. By hypothesis, the accused prefers admission of the 
report to live testimony of the witness.  Accordingly, such a policy might 
make the accused hesitant to make the demand, especially where it appears 
very probable that the witness would indeed appear if required to do so. 
23 In his Melendez-Diaz dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that it would be 
unprofessional for counsel to waive a client’s rights for fear of incurring 
judicial displeasure. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2556 
(2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). I am putting aside the possibility that 
counsel would act in that way. 
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waives objections to introduction of the lab report if he does not 
make a timely demand for live testimony.24 These statues are valid 
because, if the defense makes the demand, it is the prosecution 
that (a) bears the risk that the witness does not appear at trial, and 
(b) presents the witness’s live testimony as part of its case. 
Indeed, in some contexts, a demand-only statute should also be 
held constitutional. Under such a statute, the prosecution does not 
have to give the accused notice of intent to offer a lab report in 
prosecuting one of a prescribed list of crimes, such as those 
involving drug possession. The use of such reports in 
prosecutions of this type is so common that the accused is deemed 
to be on notice from the fact that he is being prosecuted. As 
under a notice-and-demand statute, if the accused wishes a live 
witness to testify, he must make a timely demand, and if he does, 
the prosecution must either present the live witness or forgo use 
of the evidence. So long as (1) the statute is sufficiently clear as 
to the consequences of failure to make a demand, and (2) the 
crime is one for which use of a forensic lab report would not be 
surprising, this type of statute should not be constitutionally 
troublesome. Moreover, in my view, the legislature could validly 
add to either a notice-and-demand or a demand-only statute a 
requirement that the accused assert that he is not making the 
demand simply to impose costs on the prosecution. 
States might also ease the burden by adopting two 
procedures for taking testimony of lab witnesses.25 First, at least 
on consent of the accused, they might—as Michigan has begun 
to do26—take an analyst’s testimony by televideo. Such a 
procedure offers great efficiency, for the analyst could testify 
from a studio adjoining her laboratory. Whether use of such a 
procedure would be allowed over the objection of the accused is 
doubtful.27 But, given that the accused often willingly does 
                                                          
24 See id. at 2541 (majority opinion). 
25 Other techniques states may adopt, such as videotaping autopsies and 
ensuring that a second examiner is present, are discussed in Friedman, supra 
note 21. 
26 State Police Receives Innovation Award, MICH. ST. POLICE (Dec. 9, 
2008), http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,4643,7-123-1586_1710-204770,00. 
html. 
27 For a brief analysis, see Friedman, supra note 21. 
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without live testimony altogether, there is good reason to 
suppose that he would often be willing to consent to testimony 
by video transmission, so long as the quality of the transmission 
is good enough to allow an opportunity for cross-examination 
that is not significantly impaired. 
Second, states may take depositions for the purpose of 
preserving testimony. Ideally, the deposition should be video-
recorded. If the witness is then unavailable to testify at trial, the 
deposition may be admitted. Given that the accused has had an 
opportunity to be confronted with the witness at the deposition, 
courts should be rather lenient in declaring witnesses 
unavailable, either because of their distance from the courthouse 
or because of lack of memory of a test performed long before. 
The laws of most states are extremely restrictive concerning 
the circumstances when depositions may be taken. But those 
laws can be changed, and they should be, because depositions 
offer several advantages. A deposition may be scheduled to suit 
the convenience of the witness and of the parties; the witness 
need not wait through unpredictable trial proceedings to give her 
testimony. Indeed, a lab witness can feasibly schedule several 
depositions in one day, minimizing travel time—an important 
consideration if the witness’s lab is some distance from the 
courthouse. A deposition may also be held close to the time 
when the test was performed, meaning that the witness will be 
testifying with a memory that is fresher than at the time of trial. 
A deposition also ensures against the possibility that the lab 
analyst will be dead or otherwise unable to appear at trial. 
Of course, if a deposition is held too early, it might be 
wasteful, because the case probably would plead out before trial 
(though the scheduling of the deposition might accelerate 
negotiations). Also, early on, the defense might not know 
enough about the case to conduct cross-examination adequately. 
With respect to many types of lab reports, however, this will not 
usually be a serious problem; defense counsel does not need to 
know much about the case to know that it hurts the accused if 
the prosecution can prove that a substance allegedly found in his 
possession is high-quality cocaine. An accused should be 
allowed to argue that in the particular circumstances of the case 
the deposition was too early to satisfy his confrontation right—
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but, though occasionally such arguments are meritorious,28 
courts should generally approach them with considerable 
skepticism. 
Even putting aside such relatively innovative responses as 
remote testimony and greatly expanded use of depositions, the 
bottom line remains: States that have conscientiously protected 
the accused’s confrontation rights—allowing him to demand that 
a lab witness must testify subject to confrontation if she has 
made a testimonial statement that is conveyed to the trier of 
fact—have not found the burden intolerable. There is no reason 
to suppose that the other states would find adherence to the 
Melendez-Diaz line so much more difficult if they tried it. 
Instead of putting their energy into trying to undercut the 
Melendez-Diaz doctrine, attorneys general, local prosecutors, 
and other prosecution-related government agencies should do 
what they can to make the doctrine work effectively. Some good 
prosecutors have taken this approach virtually from the 
beginning.29 I hope many more now join them. 
                                                          
28 In a recent case not involving a lab witness, the Illinois Supreme Court 
held that a prior opportunity for cross-examination was inadequate in the 
circumstances because defense counsel lacked sufficient information. People 
v. Torres, No. 111302, 2012 WL 312119, at *14 (Ill. Feb. 2, 2012). 
29 See, e.g., Patrick M. Haggan, Chief Trial Counsel, Suffolk Cnty. 
Dist. Attorney’s Office, Remarks at the New England School of Law 
Symposium: Confronting Forensic Evidence: Implications of Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts and Briscoe v. Virginia (Nov. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.nesl.edu/students/ne_journal_symposia_audio_2009.cfm. 
Many of you may expect me to get up here today and say that, “the 
sky is falling, this is horrible, this is horrible, we cannot do justice.” 
Well, I’m here to say quite the opposite . . . . [B]ased upon the 
efforts that have been made since the Melendez-Diaz decision, I can 
say that I think it’s going to work out, and I think 
especially . . . when it comes to drug cases, I’m quite confident that 
our state and hopefully all states in the country are going to be able 
to deal with Melendez-Diaz in an efficient, appropriate and just way, 
to hold those accountable but also to afford the constitutional rights 
to all defendants. 
Id. Suffolk County includes the city of Boston, where Melendez-Diaz itself 
arose. 
